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Abstract 
Communication security with quantum key distribution has been one of the important features of quantum 
information theory. A novel concept of secured direct communication has been the next step forward 
without the need to establish any shared secret key. The present paper is based on the ping – pong protocol 
with three particle GHZ state as the initial state where the receiver can simultaneously receive information 
from two parties. Possible eavesdropping on the travelling particle has been examined. 
 
Introduction 
 
The security of the quantum cryptographic protocols is based on the establishment of a 
secret key shared by two legitimate remote communicators prior to the transmission of 
any confidential message. The key is then used for encryption and decryption of message. 
It cannot although prevent eavesdropping but can check any tampering on the grounds of 
unusual error rate. Origin of quantum key distribution in its oldest form is accredited to 
Bennett and Brassard [1] in 1984. This pioneering work was named as BB84 protocol. 
According to this protocol, one of the two users of the quantum information channel 
sends quantum bits to the other. The quantum bits are transmitted either in 0 , 1  basis 
or the diagonal basis constituted by ( ) ( )1 10 1 , 0 1
2 2
+ − . The receiver then 
performs a measurement in either of the two bases. After discussing the results of their 
measurements, the users form a string of quantum bits for which the basis of 
measurement was same. This string serves the purpose of shared secret key for both 
ciphering and deciphering the secret message. Since its inception, there has been constant 
advancement in this area. In [2] Bennett proposed quantum cryptography using any two 
non-orthogonal states where the two parties share no secret initially. Ekert [3] reported a 
secret key generation scheme based on generalized Bell’s theorem. This was further 
modified in [4] describing a simpler EPR scheme for quantum cryptography without 
invoking Bell’s theorem. Generalization of BB84 quantum cryptographic protocol using 
three conjugate bases [5], quantum key distribution in the holevo limit [6] and extension 
of BB84 protocol in terms of encoding in N-dimensional Hilbert space [7] are some of 
the developments in the context of quantum key distribution. A detailed review of the 
various quantum secret sharing protocols is given in [8]. 
 
A new direction to the study of quantum cryptography was given by Biege et al [9] who 
proposed the novel concept of secure direct communication without establishing any 
shared secret key. Another advancement was made by Bostrom et al [10] by presenting a 
deterministic communication scheme using entanglement. Quantum direct 
communication protocol using blocks of EPR pairs [11], secure direct communication by 
EPR pairs and entanglement swapping [12], secure direct communication with a quantum 
one-time pad using single photons [13], deterministic direct quantum communication by 
using entanglement swapping and local unitary operations [14] are the major 
achievements in the field of quantum cryptography to date. In addition two way 
communication using EPR was presented by Nguyen [15] and recently a scheme based 
on entanglement swapping for transmission of information from many parties to a 
common party was presented by Gao et al [16]. Simultaneous Quantum secure direct 
communication among three parties was proposed by Xing-Ri Jin et al [17] using three 
particle GHZ states.  
 
In this letter, a secure direct communication scheme based on ping-pong protocol has 
been presented for a three particle GHZ state. The eavesdropper’s attack operation 
considered in [18] has been incorporated to affirm the advantage of a GHZ state over a 
two particle singlet as the initial state. To start with, we give a brief review of Bostrom 
and Felbinger’s ping-pong protocol taking modifications as introduced in [18,19] into 
consideration. Bob is in possession of two photons in an entangled state ( )1 2 0 1 1 0ψ + = +  of the polarization degree of freedom. He keeps one photon 
(the home photon) with himself and sends the other one (the travel photon) to Alice 
through a quantum channel. Alice randomly chooses to be either in message mode or 
control mode. In message mode, she can communicate 0 or 1. She does nothing i.e. 
performs an identity operation 0 0 1 1I = +  operation on the travel photon to 
communicate 0 to Bob. Else, she performs 0 0 1 1zσ = −  operation on the received 
photon to communicate 1 to Bob. The application of zσ  to ψ +  transforms the state to 
( )1 2 0 1 1 0ψ − = − . On receiving back the travel photon, Bob performs a Bell 
measurement on the two photons, which results in the final state as ψ +  or ψ − . 
Accordingly he infers the encoded message to be 0 or 1 respectively. Alternatively, if 
Alice is in control mode to check any possible eavesdropping she measures the 
polarization state of the travel photon in the z-basis { }0 , 1= . She informs Bob about 
her measurement result who also switches to control mode and performs a measurement 
in the same z-basis. In absence of any eavesdropper the photons remain in the original 
anti-correlated state. Thus variation of any kind indicates the presence of an eavesdropper 
and the transmission is immediately aborted. In [19] Wojcik pointed out that the protocol 
is not secure for transmission efficiencies lower than 60% by introducing an 
eavesdropping scheme and suggested a way to improve the original ping-pong protocol. 
This eavesdropping scheme was further improved in [18] by defining a new attack 
operation. The improved eavesdropping scheme reduced eavesdropping induced channel 
loss, therefore eavesdropper can attack all the transmitted bits in a larger domain of 
quantum channel efficiency. 
 
Ping-Pong Protocol with GHZ 
 
Let us now discuss the communication protocol starting with a three particle GHZ state 
as the initial state. In the present scheme Bob and Charlie who are at two different places 
can communicate secret messages to Alice. She can receive one bit of information from 
Bob and two bits of information from Charlie simultaneously through separate quantum 
channels. It has been assumed that an eavesdropper is present on one of the routes at the 
most. 
 
Alice prepares the initial state with three photons which can be one of the eight three-
particle GHZ states. The eight GHZ states are:  
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 5
2 6
3 7
4 8
1 1000 111 010 101
2 2
1 1000 111 010 101
2 2
1 1100 011 110 001
2 2
1 1100 011 110 001
2 2
ABC ABC ABC ABC
ABC ABC ABC ABC
ABC ABC ABC ABC
ABC ABC ABC ABC
ψ ψ
ψ ψ
ψ ψ
ψ ψ
= + = +
= − = −
= + = +
= − = −
 
(1) 
 
Bob and Charlie can perform either of the four unitary operations: 
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
x
y z
I
i
σ
σ σ
= + = +
= − = −  
for encoding their respective information. 
 
The three agree on that Bob can perform unitary operations I and yiσ  in order to 
communicate 0 and 1 respectively to Alice. At the same time, Charlie can operate upon 
his qubit with unitary operations , ,x yI iσ σ  and zσ  to encode two bits of classical 
information as 00, 01, 10, and 11, respectively. Bob and Charlie perform their respective 
operations independently. Each sender can thus communicate to Alice independently. 
This increments the confidentiality of information to be communicated because one of 
the senders may be dishonest; but he will have no idea about the message of honest 
sender.   
 
Suppose Alice prepares the initial state of three photons in entangled state 
( )5 1 010 1012ABCψ = + . She keeps the first photon (photon A) with herself and 
forwards the second (photon B) and third (photon C) photons to Bob and Charlie, 
respectively. Bob and Charlie are at two different places so photons are transmitted 
through separate quantum channels. Bob and Charlie cannot make out which of the two 
photons, B or C, has been sent to them. Alice does not declare the order of photons to 
Bob and Charlie. The eavesdropper too, will not be able to mark the order of photons. 
This again adds to the security of communication. After the distribution of photons, Bob 
and Charlie mutually decide to be either in message mode and accordingly inform Alice 
about the mode they are in.  
 
In the control mode, Bob and Charlie simply measure the polarization state of their 
respective photons in the basis { }0 , 1 . After getting the measurement result they both 
inform it to Alice through public channel. She too changes over to control mode and 
measures her photon of the shared GHZ state in the same basis. Since the initial state 
5ψ  was known to her so if she finds that the state after measurement is the same as the 
initial one, she continues the communication. Otherwise, if the measurement results are 
not in the expected order, an eavesdropper is suspected of tampering with the photons 
passing through the quantum channel. Hence the communication is at once terminated.  
 
In the message mode, Bob and Charlie are in possession of one photon each without 
knowing the order of their respective photons in the complete GHZ state under 
consideration. Going by the example with ( )5 1 010 1012ABCψ = + , Alice sends 
photon B to Bob and photon C to Charlie. On receiving the photons, Bob performs the 
operation I or yiσ on his qubit accordingly if he has to convey 0 or 1. Charlie on his part 
performs either of  , ,x yI iσ σ  and zσ  operations to encode 00, 01, 10 or 11 on his qubit. 
After performing their choiced operations, Bob and Charlie send their respective qubits 
back to Alice. She is now in possession of one and two bits of information from Bob and 
Charlie respectively. She then deciphers the precise information by performing GHZ 
measurements on the three qubits. Receiving any of the eight GHZ entangled states will 
let her know about the specific operations performed by Bob and Charlie. Table 1. shows 
the consequent state obtained by Alice after making a joint measurement, on her own 
particle and the particles sent by Bob and Charlie after performing their respective 
measurements, in the GHZ states expressed in (1). In the absence of an eavesdropper, 
using a GHZ state in place of a singlet, as in [10], enables Alice to receive two different 
messages simultaneously from two distant senders.  The operations performed by Bob 
and Charlie transform the initial state into one of the eight GHZ states. Fig. 1 shows the 
communication protocol between Alice, Bob and Charlie in the absence of an 
eavesdropper. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Ping – pong protocol with three particle GHZ state in the absence of eavesdropper.  
Table 1. Resultant GHZ state conditioned on Bob’s and Charlie’s measurement. The 
initial state is ( )5 1 010 1012ABCψ = +  
Bob’s operation Charlie’s Operation Resultant GHZ State 
I  I  ( )1 010 101
2
+  
I  xσ  ( )1 100 011
2
+  
I  yiσ  ( )1 100 011
2
−  
I  zσ  ( )1 010 101
2
−  
yiσ  I  ( )1 000 111
2
−  
yiσ  xσ  ( ) ( )1 110 001
2
− −  
yiσ  yiσ  ( ) ( )1 110 001
2
− +  
yiσ  zσ  ( )1 000 111
2
+  
 
ALICE 
(5 1 010 1012ABCψ = +
 
BOB
CHARLIE
0 : I 
1 : yiσ  
   00 : I 
   01 : xσ  
10 : yiσ  
   11 : zσ  
Taking the eavesdropping probability into consideration, it can be easily figured out that 
the eavesdropper (say Eve) cannot approach Alice’s qubit. She only has access to the 
traveling photons by intervening the quantum transmission from Alice to Bob and Charlie 
and back. In the present protocol, we have assumed that there is only one eavesdropper 
and since Bob and Charlie are at distant places so eavesdropping is operational in one of 
the quantum channels only. Following the attack operation as presented by Zhang et al 
[18] we examine the two scenarios where Bob’s particle is captured in one and Charlie’s 
in other by Eve. 
 
1. Bob’s particle is captured 
The attack operation starts with the preparation of two auxiliary modes x, y where a 
photon in the state 0  is present in y mode and the x mode is kept empty thereby 
denoted as 
x
vac . Hence after Eve’s operation the combined state can now be written as               
5 0ABC x yinitial vacψ=  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Eavesdropping on Bob’s particle. 
 
The attack operation T, consists of a sequence of gates [17] as  
xy ybx by bxy yT N C N C H= ,  
where N is CNOT gate, C is a three mode controlled polarizing beam splitter gate, and H 
is the hadamard gate. C gate in itself consists of CNOT gates and polarizing beam splitter 
which transmits (reflects photons) in the state 0(1) [19]. The attack while the photon is 
traveling from Alice to Bob leads to the state A B− , where 
ALICE 
( )1 1 010 1012ABCψ = +  
BOB 
EVE
0 : I 
 1 : yiσ
xy ybx by bxy yT N C N C H=  ( ) 11 xy ybx by bxy yT N C N C H −− =
A B T initial− =          
            ( )1 00 1 0 1 12 AC B x y B x yvac vac= +  
                              ( )1 11 0 1 0 02 AC B x y B x yvac vac+ +  
(2) 
 
The state is same as obtained by Zhang et al [18]. One can easily see that correlation of 
initial entangled GHZ state is not disturbed after the attack operation. Hence Eve can 
effectively attack without getting detected, if Alice, Bob and Charlie are in control mode. 
However, the attack operation increases the channel loss as Bob will find no photon with 
probability ¼ due to swapping of quantum channel with x mode. In the message mode, 
Bob performs I or yiσ  operation and sends back the photon to Alice. Meanwhile, Charlie 
also performs his operation on the photon received (say the I operation) and sends the 
photon back to Alice. On the way back to Alice, Eve again attacks Bob’s photon and 
performs 1T −  unitary operation. This attack is now referred to as B-A. The state after the 
second attack depends on encoding operation performed by Bob. If Bob performs I 
operation then, 
( )0
5
1 010 101 0
2
0
ABC ABC x y
x y
B A vac
vacψ
− = +
=
 
(3) 
 
Otherwise, the state becomes, 
( )1 1 1010 0 1 0 0 0122 2 ABC x y y ABC x yB A vac vac vac− = + +  
                 ( )1 11 1 1 0 1 110122 2 ABC x y y ABBC x yvac vac vac− − −  
              
( ) ( ){ }
( )
5 6
1 10 1 0 1 0 0 01
4 2
1 11 1 0 1 1 1101
22 2
y y y y x ABC x y
ABC y y x ABBC x y
vac vac vac
vac vac vac
ψ ψ= + + + +
− − −
 
(4) 
                         
Equations (3) and (4) give the possible measurement results obtained by Alice and Eve. It 
is evident from expressions (3) and (4) that by measuring the photon in channel y, Eve 
can identify the operation performed by Bob with certainty only when he performs 
operation I  on his qubit. On the other hand, if Bob operates upon his qubit with yiσ , 
Eve will be able to identify the operation performed by Bob with 1 4  probability. The 
inverse attack operation in the latter case results in eavesdropping –induced channel loss 
and quantum bit error rate (QBER). QBER, given by ( )01 10P P+ , specifies the error due 
to wrong transmission of information. 01P  is the probability with which the sender 
transmits 0 and 1 is received at the other end and 10P  is the probability with which the 
sender transmits 1 and 0 is received at the other end. This reduces Alice’s information 
about both Bob’s and Charlie’s operation to the level of 1 4 . Fig. 2 shows the 
eavesdropping scheme on Bob’s particle. 
 
The eavesdropping scheme induces channel loss and Alice receives two photons instead 
of one through Bob’s channel with a probability of 1 4 . These erroneous results in the 
transmission from Bob to Alice aids detection of eavesdropping. The legitimate users can 
set an upper bound on the channel losses due to noise. Channel loss exceeding the 
maximum limit, confirms the presence of an eavesdropper in case of an ideal channel.                                    
 
 2. Charlie’s particle is captured 
Now we consider the case when Eve manipulates Charlie’s photon. The initial 
preparations and the attack operation being same as in the previous case, gives the 
combined state after Eve’s manipulations A C−  as, 
A C−
( ) ( )1 101 0 1 0 0 10 1 0 1 12 2AB C x y C x y AB C x y C x yvac vac vac vac= + + +  
(5) 
 
 
Fig. 3. Eavesdropping on Charlie’s particle. 
 
 
ALICE 
( )1 1 010 1012ABCψ = +  
CHARLIE 
         00 : I 
         01 : xσ  
         10 : yiσ  
         11 : zσ  
 
EVE
xy ybx by bxy yT N C N C H=  ( ) 11 xy ybx by bxy yT N C N C H −− =
This is similar to A B− , hence all the discussions made in the previous section are 
applicable here too. The changes however appear after the second attack operation when 
Charlie encodes 00, 01, 10 or 11, and sends the photon back to Alice. Encoding 
operations of Bob and Charlie are independent, so for the present we may assume that 
Bob performs unitary operation I on his qubit. Writing the combined state after Charlie 
has encoded his information and Eve’s attack as C A− , we can write the four possible 
states depending upon Charlie’s information to be 00, 01, 10, and 11 as 
00 01 10 11
, , ,C A C A C A C A− − − − , respectively. The four states are, 
 
00
C A− ( )1 010 0 101 0
2 ABC y ABC y x
vac= +  
                5 0x yvacψ=  
(6) 
 
01
C A− ( )1 101 0 01 1 1 011022 2 ABC y ABC y x ABCC x yvac vac vac vac= − +          
                      ( )1 1101 0 101 1 10 0122 2 ABC y ABC y x ABC x yvac vac vac+ + +  
              ( )1 101 0 01 1 1 011022 2 ABC y ABC y x ABCC x yvac vac vac vac= − +  
                ( ) ( ){ }5 6 5 61 10 1 10 014 2y y x ABC x yvac vac vacψ ψ ψ ψ+ − + − +  
(7) 
 
10
C A− ( )1 101 0 01 1 1 011022 2 ABC y ABC y x ABCC x yvac vac vac vac= − + −  
                   ( )1 1101 0 101 1 10 1022 2 ABC y ABC y x ABC x yvac vac vac+ + +  
               ( )1 101 0 01 1 1 011022 2 ABC y ABC y x ABCC x yvac vac vac vac= − + −  
                  ( ) ( ){ }5 6 5 61 10 1 10 104 2y y x ABC x yvac vac vacψ ψ ψ ψ+ − + − +  
(8) 
 
 
11
C A− ( )1 010 0 101 1
2 ABC y ABC y x
vac= +  
               ( ) ( ){ }5 6 5 61 0 12 y y xvacψ ψ ψ ψ= + + −  
(9) 
 
Fig. 3 shows the attack operation on Charlie’s particle. Eavesdropper will not gain any 
information through her particles in the x and y modes, because in this case Charlie sends 
two bits of information through single bit by applying four different unitary operations 
with same probability.  
 
The attack operation however induces channel loss and a finite probability of Alice 
receiving two photons instead of one via Charlie’s channel. These asymmetries in the 
transmission from Bob to Alice will lead to detection of eavesdropping. In case of an 
ideal channel and noisy channel too, the legitimate users can set an upper bound on the 
channel losses due to noise. Channel loss exceeding the maximum limit, confirms the 
presence of an eavesdropper. 
 
In summary communication based on three particles GHZ state is advantageous over two 
qubit maximally entangled state. In absence of any eavesdropper, Alice, can 
simultaneously receive one and two bits of information from Bob and Charlie 
respectively. Although eavesdropping sabotages the communication between the 
legitimate users but at the same time probability of detecting eavesdropping is also 
enhanced. Alice can confirm the presence of an eavesdropper in the message mode too. 
The eavesdropping induced quantum channel loss is at the level of 1/4 when the photon is 
transmitted from Alice to Bob or Charlie. An additional channel loss is induced during 
the second attack operation on Bob’s or Charlie’s photon after they have performed their 
respective operation.  These additional losses hamper the efficacy of the quantum channel 
which in turn points towards the presence of an eavesdropper.  If the three legitimate 
users initially check the authenticity of their quantum channel by determining both 
channel loss and QBER of the quantum channel then any abnormal rise will indicate the 
interference by an eavesdropper. In addition, eavesdropping can also be detected by Alice 
when she receives two photons instead of one via Bob’s and Charlie’s channel with a 
probability of 1 8  and 1 4 . 
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